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According to commonwisdom in the ﬁeld of visual perception, top-down selective attention
is required in order to bind features into objects. In this view, even simple tasks, such as dis-
tinguishing a rotatedT from a rotated L, require selective attention since they require feature
binding. Selective attention, in turn, is commonly conceived as involving volition, intention,
and at least implicitly, awareness. There is something non-intuitive about the notion that
we might need so expensive (and possibly human) a resource as conscious awareness in
order to perform so basic a function as perception. In fact, we can carry out complex senso-
rimotor tasks, seemingly in the near absence of awareness or volitional shifts of attention
(“zombie behaviors”). More generally, the tight association between attention and aware-
ness, and the presumed role of attention on perception, is problematic. We propose that
under normal viewing conditions, the main processes of feature binding and perception
proceed largely independently of top-down selective attention. Recent work suggests that
there is a signiﬁcant loss of information in early stages of visual processing, especially in the
periphery. In particular, our texture tiling model (TTM) represents images in terms of a ﬁxed
set of “texture” statistics computed over local pooling regions that tile the visual input.We
argue that this lossy representation produces the perceptual ambiguities that have previ-
ously been as ascribed to a lack of feature binding in the absence of selective attention. At
the same time, the TTM representation is sufﬁciently rich to explain performance in such
complex tasks as scene gist recognition, pop-out target search, and navigation. A number
of phenomena that have previously been explained in terms of voluntary attention can be
explained more parsimoniously with theTTM. In this model, peripheral vision introduces a
speciﬁc kind of information loss, and the information available to an observer varies greatly
depending upon shifts of the point of gaze (which usually occur without awareness). The
available information, in turn, provides a key determinant of the visual system’s capabili-
ties and deﬁciencies.This scheme dissociates basic perceptual operations, such as feature
binding, from both top-down attention and conscious awareness.
Keywords: selective attention, limited capacity, search, scene perception, model, peripheral vision, compression
INTRODUCTION
Our senses gather copious amounts of data, seemingly far more
than our minds can fully process at once. At any given instant we
are consciously aware of only a small fraction of the incoming
sensory input. We seem to have a limited capacity for awareness,
for memory, and for the number of tasks we can simultaneously
perform. For example, our conscious experience when looking
at a street scene (e.g., Figure 1C) consists of ﬁrst noticing, per-
haps, a one-way sign, then a pedestrian, then a tree next to the
sidewalk. Subjectively, it seems as if we switch our awareness
between them. The mechanism behind this experience of shift-
ing the focus of our awareness has been called selective attention.
Traditionally, selective attention has been intimately linked with
conscious awareness. James (1890) said of attention that “focaliza-
tion, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence.”However,
the precise relationship between consciousness and attention has
remained unclear.
Theories of selective attention vary,but in general it is presumed
to operate by alternately selecting one of a number of competing
subsets of the incoming sensory data for further processing. Unse-
lected information is momentarily either unavailable, or available
only for very limited processing. (Attentional modulation, by con-
trast, refers to effects of attention on existing visual processing,
e.g., attenuation or enhancement of processing, or changes in the
tuning or contrast sensitivity of a neuron.) Selective attention can
be bottom-up, in which salient items draw attention by virtue of
being unusual when compared to nearby items (Rosenholtz, 1999,
2000). Bottom-up selective attention is generally assumed to be
largely automatic and independent of task (Wolfe, 2007). Much of
selective attention, however, is assumed to be top-down, driven by
the tasks and goals of the individual.
This framework raises the question which has occupied much
of the study of attention for the last 50 years: at what stage
does selective attention operate? In other words, what processing
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FIGURE 1 | Challenges for a model of vision. (A) Search is sometimes
difﬁcult, even when target (T) and distractors (L) are quite discriminable. (B)
Yet search is sometimes easy for fairly complex shapes, such as shaded
cubes (adapted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd: Nature 379:
165–168, copyright 1996). Furthermore, it is easy to get the gist of a scene (C)
or of an array of items (D).
occurs prior to selection – and is available to guide that selection
process – and what processing occurs later, operating only on the
selected information?
In vision, visual search has proved a rich experimental para-
digm for investigating attention (Figures 1A,B). An observer’s task
consists of ﬁnding a target among competing distractor items. If
attentional selection operates late in the processing pipeline, then
all items in the display might be processed to the point of identi-
ﬁcation, but an observer might only be able to concentrate their
awareness on one item at a time. Presumably if this were the case,
visual search would be easy, so long as the target was visually dis-
tinct from the distractors; preattentive identiﬁcation of the items
would direct attention to the target. However, visual search is often
quite difﬁcult: it’s surprisingly hard to ﬁnd a rotated “T” among
rotated “L”s, or search for a red vertical bar among red horizontal
and green vertical distractors. These results have led to the conclu-
sion that attention operates with early selection, i.e., that top-down
selective attention is necessary even for so simple an operation as
the binding together of pairs of features into a“T,”“L,”or red verti-
cal bar. This conclusion dates back to Treisman andGelade (1980).
Despite some issues, discussed in the next section, this conclusion
continues to pervade our thinking about visual perception.
The intimate relationship between consciousness and atten-
tion, coupled with the notion that attention strongly inﬂuences
perception through early selection, is problematic. For one thing,
consider the intertwined nature of consciousness and attention.
It would seem straightforward to suggest that selective attention
might be required as a gate to awareness (Treisman, 2003). How-
ever,an argument could also bemade for the converse.“Top-down”
implies goal-directed, volitional, and intentional, suggesting that
some sort of conscious awareness might be a necessary precursor
to top-down selective attention (Itti and Koch, 2001; Cavanagh,
2004). If selective attention, in turn, is required for feature bind-
ing, this is cause for concern. Surely so expensive (and possibly
human) a resource as conscious awareness is not required for basic
low-level perception. In fact, humans can perform many com-
plex tasks, apparently with neither consciousness nor attention,
such as driving home on a familiar route. Such “zombie behav-
iors” (Koch and Crick, 2001) would seem to imply that one can
remove awareness and attention without a huge impact on task
performance.
If awareness were required for top-down selective attention,
could the visual system get around a need for consciousness
by primarily processing “salient” regions of the image through
bottom-up selective attention, and occasionally applying con-
scious, top-down selective attention? As Nakayama (1990) has
previously argued, this does not seem like a viable strategy.
Dissociating awareness from attention (Nakayama, 1990; Levin
and Simons, 1997; Koch and Tsuchiya, 2006; Wyart and Tallon-
Baudry, 2008) can help resolve the issue of awareness being
improbably coupled to basic perception. The notion of “uncon-
scious inferences” (vonHelmholtz, 1867) has certainly been popu-
lar in the studyof humanvision. This theory suggests that the brain
might continuously, automatically, and often unconsciously pos-
tulate interpretations of the visual world (see Koenderink, 2011,
for a recent formulation). Testing those hypothesized interpreta-
tions would involve some sort of top-down mechanisms, perhaps
driving selective attention without awareness.
However, there are other issues with the awareness–attention–
perception triad as well. As we will argue in the Section “Discus-
sion,” early selection may be incompatible with a number of the-
ories of consciousness. Furthermore, the historical link between
consciousness and attentionmay have biased us to think of limited
capacity in a particular way, which is incompatible with reasoning
about perception. We will argue that this has led to a compli-
cated story about perception in a limited capacity system, where a
simpler story will sufﬁce.
We begin by reviewing research on early vs. late attentional
selection in vision: the logic behind the experiments and conclu-
sions, as well as issues that complicate the story. Next, we will
review recent work on the nature of the lossy representation in
early vision. This research attributes signiﬁcant information loss
not to a lack of selective attention, but rather to limitations of
peripheral vision. Such a lossy representation predicts difﬁcul-
ties in visual search previously attributed to a lack of top-down
selective attention (Rosenholtz et al., under review), including per-
ceptual ambiguities often interpreted as a lack of feature binding.
Nonetheless, this representation is sufﬁciently rich to explain per-
formance in such complex tasks as scene gist recognition, pop-out
search, and navigation. The result is a simple, coherent account
of much of the evidence used to study selective attention in
vision.
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First, a bit of terminology: in this paper we use the term selec-
tion to refer to the momentary choice of a subset of the sensory
input,with the intent later, perhaps, to select a different subset.While,
for instance, having only three cone types in the retina might be
thought of as representing only a subset of the input,we do not call
this “selection,” as there is no plan to later use cones with different
responsivity. On the other hand, moving ones’ eyes to direct the
highest density of photoreceptors to a particular location should
certainly be thought of as involving a form of selection, but we do
not refer to this as selective attention. Attention involves separate
mechanism(s), a focus that may not agree with the point of ﬁxa-
tion, and possibly different effects upon perception than shifting
the point of gaze.
EARLY OR LATE ATTENTIONAL SELECTION IN VISUAL
PROCESSING?
The visual system subjects the visual input to stages of processing,
from basic feature measurements in early vision, through mid-
level grouping, recognition, memory, and higher-level cognition.
A number of initial processing stages are assumed to occur preat-
tentively and in parallel across the visual ﬁeld. At some point
in the processing stream, selection occurs. What is selected is
determined by the information available from the preattentive
processing stages, as well as any task-relevant information such as
likely locationof a target (see also“GuidedSearch,”Cave andWolfe,
1990). In themost straightforward version of the story, the selected
information passes through a limited capacity channel to higher
processing, e.g., semantic analysis, whereas the unselected infor-
mation becomes unavailable for further processing and conscious
awareness (Broadbent, 1958).
Atwhat stage does attentional selection occur, i.e.,what compu-
tations can occur without attention? To answer this question, one
must ﬁrst run experiments in which attentional selection is likely
to matter, i.e., situations in which the sensory input contains mul-
tiple components competing for limited processing resources. For
example, dichotic listening experiments simultaneously present
two auditory stimuli, such as speech, one to each ear, and ask
participants to attend to one or both. Easy tasks presumably use
computations that happen before selection, whereas difﬁcult tasks
use computations that happen after attentional selection.
In audition, the early vs. late selection story at ﬁrst seemed
straightforward. Listeners can easily distinguish, in the unattended
ear, tones from speech, and male from female voices. However,
they have difﬁculty identifying even a single word or phrase pre-
sented to the unattended ear, determining whether the language
is English or German, and even distinguishing forward speech
from reversed (Cherry, 1953). Broadbent (1958) took these results
to demonstrate early selection, in which only low-level “physical”
characteristics – e.g., the frequency spectrum – of the signal can
be processed without attention.
However, a number of empirical ﬁndings are at odds with
Broadbent’s early selection theory, including the classic demon-
stration by Moray (1959) that people can recognize subjectively
important “messages,” such as their own names, in the unat-
tended stream of conversation. To accommodate these ﬁndings,
Treisman (1960) proposed attenuation theory, which posits that
unattended information, rather than being excluded from further
processing, instead has attenuated signal strength. At later stages
processing occurs only if the signal falls above some threshold. An
important message such as the listener’s name will be semanti-
cally processed, in this scheme, because even its attenuated signal
strength will often fall above-threshold. By this theory, attentional
attenuation happens early. The mere attenuation of unattended
information does not obviously resolve issues of limited capacity
at this early processing stage, though it does facilitate later selection
of above-threshold signals for further processing.
In vision, the dominant experimental paradigm for studying
early vs. late selection has been visual search, where the target
and distractors are presumed to compete for limited processing
resources. As discussed in the Section“Introduction,” initial results
in visual search led researchers to conclude that selective attention
operated early in visual processing, and to develop the highly inﬂu-
ential feature integration theory (FIT,Treisman andGelade, 1980).
FIT suggests that spatially organized “maps” of basic features such
as orientation, color, and size, can be preattentively extracted in
parallel across the visual scene. However, any further processing
requires attention, including the binding together of basic features.
This theory predicts that searching for a target deﬁned by a basic
feature is efﬁcient, parallel, and does not require attention. How-
ever, search for a target deﬁned by conjunction or conﬁguration of
basic features requires the serial deployment of selective attention.
Although a number of search results support the early selection
story, a number of issues arise; here we focus on only a few of the
most critical. For one thing, the level at which attentional selection
operates in visual search has seemed inconsistent. Studies have
shown that some properties related to extraction of 3-D shape,
direction of lighting, and apparent reﬂectance can be processed
in parallel across the visual scene and thus enable easy search
(Enns and Rensink, 1990; Sun and Perona, 1996). How could it be
that processing of 3-D shape, lighting, and/or reﬂectance occurs
preattentively, but not simple feature binding?
Furthermore, different paradigms have led to different con-
clusions about what processing occurs preattentively. Search for
a scene containing an animal among non-animal scenes (Van-
Rullen et al., 2004) or for a navigable scene among non-navigable
scenes (Greene andWolfe, 2011) seems to require a serial, attentive
process. This is not surprising for FIT, since no single basic feature
can identify an animal or a navigable path; search for these tar-
gets should require feature binding, which requires attention. FIT
would also seem compatible with evidence from change-blindness
that without attention the details of the scenes aremurky (Rensink
et al., 1997; Simons and Levin, 1997).
However, a number of studies have shown that natural scenes
can be perceived preattentively in a dual-task paradigm. In this
paradigm, the observer is given fewer competing sensory inputs
than in a typical search display, but must complete both central
and peripheral tasks. In this paradigm, observers can perform a
peripheral task in which they identify whether a scene contains
an animal or not, while simultaneously specifying whether letters
presented at the center of the display are all “T”s, all “L”s, or mixed
(Li et al., 2002). Furthermore, this result agrees with outcomes of
rapid perception experiments. Rapid perception paradigms allow
for brief attention to a scene, but minimal time to select multi-
ple regions of that scene for further processing. Yet observers can
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discern much information about the gist of a scene, sufﬁcient to
identify general scene categories and properties (Rousselet et al.,
2005; Greene andOliva, 2009) and perform basic object detection,
for example determining whether an image contains an animal
(Thorpe et al., 1996; Kirchner and Thorpe, 2006), vehicle (Van-
Rullen and Thorpe, 2001), or human face (Crouzet et al., 2010). A
brief (26ms) glance at a scene is also sufﬁcient to allow observers
to distinguish speciﬁc types of animals (birds or dogs) from other
animal distractors (Mace et al., 2009). How is this possible with
minimal attention, when attention seems necessary to tell a “T”
from an “L”?
The dual-task paradigm has also provided conﬂicting results
for preattentive processing of 3-D shape. As mentioned above,
ﬁndings from visual search have suggested that some 3-D prop-
erties can be processed preattentively. However, discriminating
between an upright, shaded cube and an inverted one is a difﬁcult,
attention-demanding task in a dual-task paradigm.
In order to reconcile the above results, a number of researchers
have postulated that certain visual computations, such as recogniz-
ing the gist of a scene, do not require selective attention (Rensink,
2001; Treisman, 2006), perhaps occurring in a separate pathway
with no bottleneck limitations (Wolfe, 2007). Others have pos-
tulated a hierarchy of preattentive features, which includes not
only simple features like color and orientation but also complex
conjunctive features that respond to speciﬁc object or scene cat-
egories, like “animal,” “vehicle,” or “face” (VanRullen et al., 2004;
Reddy and VanRullen, 2007). These authors reason that since the
more complex features are processed by higher levels of the visual
stream, which have larger receptive ﬁelds, they cannot preatten-
tively guide visual search in the way that a low-level feature like
color can. However, they do allow for preattentive processing of
scenes in dual tasks. This theory, too, gives special status to pro-
cessing of scenes; complex conjunctive features exist if and only if
the brain has cells or brain regions speciﬁc to the particular type of
discrimination. VanRullen et al. (2004) then, should predict easy
dual-task performance for scene, face, and place tasks.
However, it is not merely scenes, faces, and places that afford
easy preattentive processing of gist. It is easy to get the gist of a set
of items (Treisman, 2006). Figure 1D can easily be seen to contain
an array of circles split into quarters, alternating black and white.
We have a rough guess as to their number. Yet it is surprisingly
difﬁcult to tell that a 3× 3 sub-array consists of white “bowties,”
whereas the rest are black bowties. How do we get a sense of the
complex array of shapes,yet havedifﬁculty discriminatingbetween
black andwhite bowties? Recently, researchers have suggested that,
even without attention, the visual system can compute “ensemble
statistics”of a set of items, such asmean size andmean orientation
(see Alvarez, 2011, for a review). Clearly, however, the limited set
of ensemble statistics which have been proposed is insufﬁcient to
capture the gist of Figure 1D.
As another way out of these conundrums, some researchers
(e.g., Allport, 1993; Tsotsos et al., 1995) have argued that selection
does not have a single locus of operation, but can occur through-
out visual processing. Similarly, Nakayama (1990) and Treisman
(2006) have suggested that one can attend to regions of varying size
and complexity, and that the available processing depends upon
the nature of the attended region. Attend to an object, and identify
that object, but perhaps not others. Attend to a set of objects, and
extract set (“ensemble”) properties, but perhaps not the properties
of individual objects. Attend to a scene, and get the scene gist.
Theories with ensemble statistics, special status for scene pro-
cessing, or ﬂexible representations which depend upon task may
well prove correct (the last is certainly difﬁcult to disprove). Until
these theories are more fully speciﬁed, we fundamentally do not
know what they can and cannot predict.
In this paper we propose a simpler, uniﬁed explanation, by
re-conceptualizing early visual processing steps. Discriminating
between early and late attentional selection fundamentally requires
knowledge of the stages of processing, and that knowledge remains
incomplete. In particular, if early stages include signiﬁcant infor-
mation loss not attributable to selective attention, this will pro-
foundly affect our interpretation of the experimental results. We
next review a recent model of just such an information loss in
peripheral vision, and show that this lossy representation may be
responsible for many of the puzzling results described above.
RECENT WORK: PERIPHERAL VISION
Peripheral vision is, as a rule, worse than foveal vision, and often
muchworse. Only a ﬁnite number of nerve ﬁbers can emerge from
the eye, and rather than providing uniformly mediocre vision, the
eye trades off sparse sampling in the periphery for sharp, high
resolution foveal vision. If we need ﬁner detail (for example for
reading), we move our eyes to bring the fovea to the desired loca-
tion. This economical design continues into the cortex: the cortical
magniﬁcation factor expresses the way in which cortical resources
are concentrated in central vision at the expense of the periphery.
However, acuity loss is not the entire story, as made clear by the
visual phenomena of crowding. An example is given in Figure 2. A
reader ﬁxating the central cross will likely have no difﬁculty identi-
fying the isolated letter on the left. However, the same letter can be
difﬁcult to recognize when ﬂanked by additional letters, as shown
on the right. An observer might see the letters on the right in the
wrong order, perhaps confusing the word with “BORAD.” They
might not see an “A” at all, or might see strange letter like shapes
made up of a mixture of parts from several letters. This effect can-
not be explained by the loss of acuity, as the reduction in acuity
necessary to cause ﬂankers to interfere with the central target on
the right would also completely degrade the isolated letter on the
left. (Lettvin, 1976,makes similar points about both the subjective
experience and the infeasibility of acuity loss as an explanation.)
What mechanism could account for crowding? Recent research
has suggested that the representation in peripheral vision con-
sists of summary statistics computed over local pooling regions
(Parkes et al., 2001; Levi, 2008; Pelli and Tillman, 2008; Balas
et al., 2009). In particular, we have proposed that the visual system
FIGURE 2 |Visual crowding.The “A” on the left is easy to recognize, if it is
large enough, whereas the A amidst the word “BOARD” can be quite
difﬁcult to identify. This cannot be explained by a mere loss of acuity in
peripheral vision.
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might measure a ﬁxed set of summary statistics: the marginal
distribution of luminance; luminance autocorrelation; correla-
tions of the magnitude of responses of oriented V1-like wavelets
across differences in orientation, neighboring positions, and scale;
and phase correlation across scale. This perhaps sounds compli-
cated,but really is not: computing a given second-order correlation
merely requires taking responses of a pair of V1-like ﬁlters, point-
wise multiplying them, and taking the average over a “pooling
region.” These summary statistics have been shown to do a good
job of capturing texture appearance (Portilla and Simoncelli, 2000;
Balas, 2006). Discriminability based on these summary statis-
tics has been shown to predict performance recognizing crowded
letters in the periphery (Balas et al., 2009).
What do we know about the pooling regions over which the
summary statistics are computed?Work in crowding suggests that
they grow linearly with eccentricity – i.e., with distance to the
center of ﬁxation – with a radius of ∼0.4–0.5 the eccentricity.
This has been dubbed “Bouma’s law,” and it seems to be invari-
ant to the contents of the stimulus (Bouma, 1970). The pooling
regions are elongated radially outward from ﬁxation. Presum-
ably overlapping pooling regions tile the entire visual input. We
call our model, which represents images in terms of a ﬁxed set
of hypothesized “texture” statistics, computed over local pooling
regions that tile the visual input in this fashion, the texture tiling
model (TTM).
Representation in terms of a ﬁxed set of summary statistics
provides an alternative tool for dealing with a limited process-
ing capacity in vision. Limited capacity, rather than implying a
need for selective attention (Broadbent, 1958), may require our
perceptual systems to “describe nature economically” (Attneave,
1954). Attneave suggested that “a major function of the perceptual
machinery is to strip away some of the redundancy of stimula-
tion, to describe or encode incoming information in a form more
economical than that in which it impinges on the receptors.”Rep-
resentation in terms of summary statistics provides a compressed
representation of the visual input, which can capture detailed
information at the expense of uncertainty about the locations of
those details. Figure 3 gives a demonstration. Figure 3B shows
an image synthesized to have the same summary statistics as the
original image in Figure 3A, using the texture synthesis algo-
rithm of Portilla and Simoncelli (2000). This algorithm starts
with an image – usually random noise – and iteratively coerces
it until it has approximately the same summary statistics as the
original. We call these synthesized images “mongrels.” The results
are intriguing. In order to coerce the noise “seed” image to share
the same statistics as the original, apparently one must start mak-
ing quadrisected circles! However, the statistics are not sufﬁcient to
distinguish between circles with black vs. white bowties; Figure 3B
has the same statistics as Figure 3A, yet it contains both bowtie
patterns, and the original contained only black. This may explain
the difﬁculty segmenting the array in Figure 1D.
Figures 3C,D shows another example, in which we have syn-
thesized a scene to have the same local summary statistics as the
original. The statistics seem sufﬁcient to categorize the scene, and
even navigate down the sidewalk. The details – such as the num-
ber of cars on the street – are murky, in line with results from
change-blindness.
While additional work is required to pin down the right statis-
tical measurements, our present set provide a good initial guess.
Certainly they seem quite plausible as a visual system representa-
tion. Early stages of standardmodels of object recognition typically
measure responses of oriented, V1-like feature detectors, as does
our model. They then build up progressively more complex fea-
tures by looking for co-occurrence of simple structures over a small
pooling region (Fukushima, 1980; Riesenhuber and Poggio, 1999;
Deco and Rolls, 2004). These co-occurrences, computed over a
larger pooling region, can approximate the correlations computed
by our model.
Second, our summary statistics appear to be quite close to sufﬁ-
cient. Balas (2006) showed that observers are barely above chance
at parafoveal discrimination between a grayscale texture synthe-
sized with this set of statistics and an original patch of texture.
More recent results have shown a similar sufﬁciency of these sum-
mary statistics for capturing the appearance of real scenes. Free-
man and Simoncelli (2011) synthesized full-ﬁeld versions of nat-
ural scenes. These syntheses were generated to satisfy constraints
based on local summary statistics in regions that tile the visual ﬁeld
and grow linearly with eccentricity. When viewing at the appro-
priate ﬁxation point, observers had great difﬁculty discriminating
real from synthetic scenes. That the proposed statistics are close
to sufﬁcient for capturing both texture and scene appearance is
impressive; much information has been thrown away, and yet
FIGURE 3 | (A) Original image. (B)We can visualize the information
available in a set of summary statistics by synthesizing a new
“sample” with the same statistics as the original. Here we
constrain the statistics for a single pooling region (the whole image).
(C) Original photograph. (D) A new “sample,” which has the same
local summary statistics as the original. The local regions overlap,
tile the visual ﬁeld, and grow linearly with distance from the ﬁxation
(blue cross).
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observers have difﬁculty telling the difference between an original
image and a noise image coerced to have the same statistics.
Finally, signiﬁcant subsets of the proposed summary statistics
are also necessary. If a subset of statistics is necessary, then tex-
tures synthesized without that set should be easily distinguishable
from the original texture. Balas (2006) has shown that observers
become much better at parafoveal discrimination between real
and synthesized textures when the syntheses do not make use of
either the marginal statistics of luminance, or of the correlations
of magnitude responses of V1-like oriented ﬁlters.
To test the TTM, we make use of texture synthesis techniques
(Portilla and Simoncelli, 2000, for local patches; Rosenholtz, 2011,
for complex images) to generate new images – “mongrels” – that
share approximately the same summary statistics as each original
stimulus.Mongrels enable intuitions and the generationof testable
predictions from our model. The general logic is essentially this:
we can generate a number of mongrels (e.g., Figure 3B) which
share the same local summary statistics as each original stimu-
lus (e.g., Figure 3A). The model cannot tell these mongrels apart
from the original, nor from each other. If these images are indis-
tinguishable, how hard would a given task be? If we could not tell
an image with all black bowtie circles from one with both white-
and black- bowtie circles, it would be quite difﬁcult to, say, ﬁnd a
white bowtie circle among black bowtie circles.
By synthesizing mongrel images which are equivalent to the
original image, according to the model, we can generate testable
model predictions for a wide range of tasks. Most powerfully,
we can predict performance on higher-level visual tasks without
needing a model of higher-level vision. We do not need to build
a black vs. white bowtie discriminator to tell from mongrels (like
Figure 3B) that ourmodel predicts this task will be difﬁcult.We do
not need to model scene classiﬁcation to tell from mongrels (like
Figure 3D) that the model predicts easy discrimination between
a street scene and a beach. In practice, we ask subjects to per-
form a discrimination task with a number of synthesized images,
and we measure their task performance with those mongrels as
a measure of the informativeness of the summary statistics for a
given task (see Materials and Methods.) We have previously used
this methodology to make testable predictions of the model for a
number of visual crowding tasks, and shown that the model can
predict performance on these tasks (Balas et al., 2009).
RESULTS: THE MODEL MAKES SENSE OF DIVERSE
PHENOMENA
FEATURE, CONJUNCTION, AND CONFIGURATION SEARCH
Rethinking visual search in light of recent understanding of
peripheral vision provides immediate insight. If early visual repre-
sentation is in terms of a ﬁxed set of summary statistics, computed
over pooling regions that grow with eccentricity, then for typ-
ical search displays many of those pooling regions will contain
more than a single item. This suggests that the visual system’s
real task as it confronts a search display is to discriminate between
peripheral patches containing a target (plus distractors) from those
containing only distractors. This is quite different from the usual
formulation, in which the key determinant of search performance
is whether an individual target is preattentively discriminable from
an individual distractor.
In Figure 4, the target (“Q”) is not visible near the current ﬁx-
ation (red crosshairs), so the subject continues searching. Where
to look next? A reasonable strategy is to seek out regions that
have promising statistics. The green and blue disks represent two
hypothetical pooling regions in the periphery, one containing the
target (plus distractors), the other containing only distractors. If
the statistics in a target-present patch are noticeably different from
those of target-absent patches, then this can guide the subject’s eyes
toward the target. However, if the statistics are inadequate to make
the distinction, then the subject must proceed without guidance.
The prediction is that to a ﬁrst approximation, search will
be easy only if the visual statistics of target-present patches
are sufﬁciently different from those of target-absent patches.
FIGURE 4 | (A) In visual search, we propose that on each ﬁxation (red cross),
the visual system computes a ﬁxed set of summary statistics over each local
patch. Some patches contain a target and distractors (blue), whereas most
contain only distractors (green). The job of the visual system is to distinguish
between promising and unpromising peripheral patches and to move the eyes
accordingly. (B)We hypothesize, therefore, that peripheral patch
discriminability, based on a rich set of summary statistics, critically limits
search performance. To test this, we select a number of target+distractor
and distractor-only patches, and generate a number of patches with the same
statistics (“mongrels”). We then ask observers to discriminate between
target+distractor and distractor-only synthesized patches, and examine
whether this discriminability predicts search difﬁculty.
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FIGURE 5 | Example mongrels for target-present (row 1) and
target-absent (row 2) patches, for three classic search conditions.
(A) tilted among vertical; (B) orientation–contrast conjunction search;
(C)T among L. How discriminable are target-present from target-absent
mongrels? Inspection suggests that the summary statistic model correctly
predicts easy search for tilted among vertical, more difﬁcult conjunction
search, and yet more difﬁcult search for T among L, as validated by results in
Figure 6.
(Two conditions with the same statistical discriminability might
nonetheless lead to different performance due to peculiarities of
later processing; e.g., stimuli like letters might be more effectively
processed than non-letters at a later stage.) We can generate mon-
grels of target-present and target-absent patches, which share the
same summary statistics as the corresponding original patches.
Figure 5 shows examples for three conditions. To ourmodel, these
mongrels are indistinguishable from the original patches. How
difﬁcult would we expect a given search task to be?
Search for a tilted line among vertical is easy (Treisman and
Gelade, 1980). The target-present mongrels for this condition
clearly show a target-like item, whereas the distractor-only mon-
grels do not. Patch discrimination based upon statistics alone
should be easy, predicting easy search.
Conjunction search for a white vertical among black verti-
cals and white horizontals shows some intriguing “illusory con-
junctions” (Treisman and Gelade, 1980; Treisman and Schmidt,
1982) – white verticals – in the distractor-only mongrels. This
apparent lack of binding has previously been attributed to a need
for selective attention for feature binding, but in our model is due
to representation in terms of a rich set of image statistics. The
inherent ambiguity in this representation makes it more difﬁcult
to discriminate between target-present and target-absent patches,
and correctly predicts more difﬁcult search.
Search for a “T” among “L”s is known as a difﬁcult “conﬁg-
uration search” (Wolfe et al., 1989). In fact, the mongrels for
this condition show “T”-like items in some of the distractor-only
patches, and no “T”-like items in some of the target+ distractor
mongrels.Again,wenote that themodel predicts confusionswhich
have previously been attributed to a lack of preattentive “bind-
ing.” Patch discrimination based upon summary statistics looks
difﬁcult, predicting difﬁcult search.
Figure 6 plots search performance for ﬁve classic search
tasks, vs. the discriminability of target-present vs. target-absent
mongrels (see Materials and Methods). Results agree with the
above intuitions. The data shows a clear relationship between
search performance and visual discriminability of patch sta-
tistics as measured by human discrimination of the mongrels
(R2 = 0.99, p< 0.01; Rosenholtz et al., under review). Crucially,
one can predict classic differences between feature, conjunction,
FIGURE 6 | Search performance vs. statistical discriminability. y -Axis:
search performance for correct target-present trials, as measured by log 10
(search efﬁciency), i.e., the mean number of milliseconds (ms) of search
time divided by the number of display items. x -Axis: “statistical
discriminability” of target-present from target-absent patches based on the
empirical discriminability, d ′, of the corresponding mongrels. There is a
strong relationship between search difﬁculty and mongrel discriminability,
in agreement with our predictions. [y -axis error bars=SE of the mean;
x -axis error bars=95% conﬁdence intervals for log 10 (d ′)].
and conﬁguration search, with a model with no attentional
selection.
SEARCH AND DUAL-TASK PERFORMANCE ON SHADED CUBES
The previous section demonstrated that the TTM can pre-
dict search results previously attributed to an early attentional
selection mechanism. What about search results which are
more problematic for early selection? Enns and Rensink (1990)
demonstrated that searching for a side-lit cube among top-lit
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shaded cubes is quite efﬁcient (∼8ms/item), particularly when
compared with search using “equivalent” 2-D targets and distrac-
tors (>20ms/item). This would seem to suggest that direction
of illumination might be available prior to operation of selective
attention. Other results from Enns and Rensink (1990) and Sun
and Perona (1996) have suggested that 3-D orientation might be
available preattentively. This work calls into question the early
selection story, as surely 3-D orientation and lighting direction
do not occur earlier in visual processing than piecing together
vertical and horizontal bars to make a T-junction. The story has
been further complicated by evidence that observers have difﬁ-
culty distinguishing upright from inverted cubes in a dual-task
setting (VanRullen et al., 2004).
We examinedwhether theTTMcan shed light on these puzzling
results.We generated a number of mongrels for target-present and
target-absent patches for search for a side-lit cube among top-lit
(Enns and Rensink’s Experiment 3A), as well as for some of their
“equivalent”2-D targets and distractors (Experiments 2B and 2C).
As described in Section“Materials andMethods,”observers judged
whether eachmongrel came from an original patch that contained
or did not contain the target.
Preliminary results demonstrate that the TTM can predict eas-
ier search for the 3-D condition (d ′ = 2.44) than for the 2-D
conditions (mean d ′ = 1.78). Essentially what this means is that
there are 2-D pattern differences between the 3-D condition and
the 2-D conditions, which show up in the summary statistics and
make it easier in the 3-D condition to discriminate target-present
from target-absent patches. The summary statistic information
provides better search guidance in the 3-D case than in the 2-D
conditions.
We then asked why distinguishing between an upright and
inverted cube was difﬁcult under dual-task conditions. For our
model, this is actually an unsurprising result. Our summary
statistic representation, within a single pooling region, is theo-
retically unable to tell an upright from an inverted ﬁgure (see
Figures 7A,B), though constraints from multiple pooling regions
may be able to do the discrimination. This is an odd conse-
quence of our model, which nonetheless has correctly predicted
performance in a peripheral discrimination task (Balas et al.,
2009).
What sense can we make, then, of easy search (Enns and
Rensink, 1990; Sun and Perona, 1996) for an inverted cube among
upright cubes? Enns and Rensink reported slopes of 8ms/item.
For visual search, it matters not only what the target and distrac-
tor look like, but also what the search display looks like. Figure 1B
shows an example display, adapted from Sun and Perona (1996).
The cubes are so densely packed that they are almost regularly
aligned with one another (Enns and Rensink (1990) used similar
FIGURE 7 | Mongrels of shaded cubes. (A) Mongrels synthesized from
an image containing a single upright cube (inset). (B) Mongrels of an
image with a single inverted cube (inset). The statistics have difﬁculty
discriminating an upright from inverted cube. (C–F) Original (left) and
mongrel (right) pairs. (C,D) Patches from a dense, regular display. (E,F)
Patches from a sparse display. For the dense display, the target-absent
mongrel shows no sign of a target, while the target-present mongrel
does. For the sparse display, both mongrels show signs of a target.
(Single pooling region mongrels wrap around both horizontally and
vertically, so a cube may start at the top and end at the bottom of the
image. The mongrels in (C–F) have been shifted to the middle, for easy
viewing.)
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FIGURE 8 | (A) An example of our search displays. Target is an inverted
cube; distractors are upright cubes. (B) More irregular search displays
leads to less efﬁcient search, for this task. Average response times on
correct target-present trials vs search set size. RT slope of searching for
upright is 40ms/item, the slope of searching for inverted cube is
21ms/item.
but less dense displays). The dense, regular array of cubes may
have introduced emergent features that could serve as cues to
facilitate search. Figures 7C,D shows mongrels of dense vs. sparse
displays. It appears from this demo that the dense regular arrange-
ment contains features that favor recognition of homogeneous,
distractor-only patches. (Future work is required to test whether
the TTM can predict effects of item arrangement.)
To test the possibility of emergent features in the dense displays,
we re-ran search conditions with upright and inverted cubes sim-
ilar to those described by Sun and Perona (1996), but with the
same random, less dense arrangement of elements as used in our
previous search tasks (e.g., Figure 8A). As we expected, less dense
and regular displays led to far less efﬁcient search (Figure 8B).
We conclude that earlier results demonstrating efﬁcient search
in these particular cube search conditions were efﬁcient due to
yet-unspeciﬁed emergent features of the displays.
Our TTM explains not only the basic visual search results, but
also easier search for some 3-D cube stimuli than for “equiva-
lent” 2-D stimuli. These results were problematic for an early
selection story. Furthermore, we predict difﬁcult dual-task per-
formance discriminating upright vs. inverted cubes. Insights
gained from the model led us to re-run search experiments on
upright vs. inverted cubes, and to the conclusion that the original
search displays may have enabled easy search due to an emergent
feature.
SEARCH, DUAL-TASK, AND RAPID PERCEPTION OF SCENES
Other problematic results for the early selection story have
involved scene perception. Scene perception is very fast, andpeople
can do scene discrimination tasks, such as animal vs. non-animal,
when attention is engaged elsewhere. However, searching for an
animal scene among non-animal distractors is a slow, serial search
that requires attention. If animals can be detected preattentively in
a dual-task situation, why do not they “pop-out” in a search task
(Li et al., 2002; VanRullen et al., 2004)?
VanRullen et al. (2004) suggest that any discrimination task
can be preattentive if there is a dedicated population of neurons
in visual cortex that performs that task. With simple tasks, such
as color discrimination, the dedicated neurons are located early in
the visual system and these neurons can also guide visual search,
producing “pop-out” effects. For more complex discriminations,
such as animal vs. non-animal, the dedicated neurons are located
higher in the visual stream, probably in inferotemporal cortex.
These neurons cannot guide visual search, because their receptive
ﬁelds are so large that they typically contain multiple items, so
there is neural competition between target and distractors (Reddy
and VanRullen, 2007).
Here we ask whether our model can explain the dichotomy
between search performance and rapid/dual-task performance
without needing to rely upon special neuronal populations dedi-
cated to particular scene discrimination tasks. Earlier in this paper,
we argued that the real task for the visual system in visual search
is not to discriminate between a single target and a single distrac-
tor, but rather is often to discriminate between target-present and
target-absent patches which may contain information from mul-
tiple items. With this reconceptualization of search, one expects
search performance often to conﬂict with performance of tasks
involving single items. We hypothesize that typical scene discrim-
ination tasks (such as animal vs. non-animal) are easy with rapid
presentation, even in a dual-task situation, because the summary
statistic representation is sufﬁcient to distinguish a single target
from a distractor. However, when multiple images are presented
in a crowded search display, the summary statistics mix features
from nearby images, and it is no longer possible to clearly identify
the region of the array which contains the target.
To test this hypothesis, we ﬁrst had subjects perform one of two
go/no-go rapid scene perception tasks (animal vs. non-animal or
vehicle vs. non-vehicle) with image presentation either at ﬁxation
or 11˚ to the left or right of ﬁxation (see Materials and Meth-
ods). Subjects were asked to respond to target images (animals
or vehicles) as quickly as possible. We also synthesized “mon-
grel” versions of each of the images from the go/no-go tasks,
using the TTM with ﬁxation of the synthesis procedure set as
in the go/no-go task (either in the center of each image, or 11˚
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FIGURE 9 | Example stimuli from animal- and vehicle-detection tasks. (A)Target images used in the go/no-go task. (B) Mongrels synthesized with ﬁxation
in the center of the image. (C) Mongrels synthesized with ﬁxation 11˚ left of the image center.
FIGURE 10 | Comparison of mongrel and go/no-go responses. (A) Animal vs. non-animal task. (B) Vehicle vs. non-vehicle task.
to the left or right of center). Examples of target images from
the go/no-go task and their corresponding mongrels are shown
in Figure 9. A separate group of subjects performed one of
two mongrel-classiﬁcation tasks: discriminating animal mongrels
from non-animals or vehicle mongrels from non-vehicles.
Overall, subjects perform very well in the go/no-go tasks: aver-
aging 94% correct detection at ﬁxation, and 74 and 76% correct
when detecting animals or vehicles, respectively, at 11˚ eccen-
tricity. Performance is considerably lower with the mongrels:
subjects average 85% correct in distinguishing mongrel animals
from non-animals and 81% correct in distinguishing vehicles
from non-vehicles. Performance with the peripheral mongrels is
even lower, but still above chance: subjects average 60% correct in
the animal/non-animal task and 62% correct in the vehicle/non-
vehicle mongrel task. More work remains to determine the cause
of this difference in performance, particularly on the peripheral
tasks. These peripheral mongrels are challenging for our synthesis
procedure, in terms of converging to a solution with the same sta-
tistics as the original. It is also possible that ourmodel throws out a
bit too much information, and that this was apparent in the scene
task but not on crowding and search tasks with simpler displays.
Despite the overall difference in accuracy between the two tasks,
target detection in the go/no-go rapid perception tasks correlates
with responses to the mongrel images. Figure 10 shows a com-
parison of the responses to images in each task: images have been
binned according to the proportion of target responses (“animal”
or “vehicle”) they received in the mongrel sorting task, and points
represent the average proportion of target responses to each image
bin in the go/no-go task. The more strongly a mongrel is classiﬁed
as “animal,” the more “animal” responses it receives in the go/no-
go task, and the same is true of vehicles. The linear relationship
between mongrel and go/no-go responses holds both when the
image is presented centrally andwhen it is presented in the periph-
ery. The fact that mongrel animal images can be distinguished
from mongrel non-animals does not mean that search for animal
among non-animal distractors should be an easy pop-out search.
When multiple images are presented in a search display, features
of the distractors may be combined with features of the target to
mask its location, or combined features from two different distrac-
tors may create an illusory target. Figure 11 illustrates this with
a “mongrel” version of a scene search array, similar to the animal
among non-animal search arrays used by VanRullen et al. (2004).
The location of the animal image is not obvious in the mongrel
array, even though this particular animal image’s mongrel is fairly
easy to identify as an animal when it is synthesized as an isolated
image in the periphery.
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FIGURE 11 | (A) A scene search array in the style of VanRullen et al. (2004).
(B) A mongrel version of the array, ﬁxation at center. It is difﬁcult to
determine, from the mongrel, whether there is an animal. (C) Mongrels
generated from two scenes from the array (the elk and the hedge), shown in
isolation in the periphery. In this case, it is easy to determine which image
contains the animal.
DISCUSSION
This paper has focused on re-evaluating the role of top-down
selective attention on perceptual processing. In the standard story,
based on studies of visual search, such attentional selection occurs
early in the processing stream. This conclusion was drawn from
reasonable assumptions – at the time and even today – about early
stages of processing,and reasonable experimental logic basedupon
those assumptions. Yet the resulting theories have been problem-
atic, and had difﬁculty predicting a number of basic effects, such
as extraction of gist from scenes and other displays, search for
3-D shaded cubes among differently lit cubes, zombie behaviors,
and results from different experimental paradigms. We have sug-
gested that these results can be explained more simply by a newer
model of the processing in early vision, in which the visual system
represents its inputs by a rich set of summary statistics.
For clarity, it is worth reformulating both the old and new ways
of thinking in terms of strategies for dealing with limited capacity.
The previous story assumes that themechanism for operatingwith
a limited capacity channel is selective attention. By this account,
various parts of the input can be thought of as competing for use
of that channel. These parts might be objects (e.g., the images of a
one-way sign, a pedestrian, and a tree), feature bands (e.g.,“red”or
“vertical”), or locations (“upper left”). Selective attention is pre-
sumed to enable the different parts of the input to share the limited
capacity channel by taking turnsusing that channel. Indigital com-
munications – from which the “limited capacity” terminology in
psychology derives – strategies for splitting up use of the chan-
nel so that multiple competing “senders” can access it are known
as multiplexing, and the particular strategy of having the senders
take turns using the channel is known as time-division multiplex-
ing. (A number of other strategies exist; cell phone systems, for
example, use an entirely different kind of multiplexing.) “Selec-
tion,” as deﬁned in the Section “Introduction,” is equivalent to
multiplexing, and common use of the term refers to time-division
multiplexing.
When it comes to conscious awareness, the analogy to time-
division multiplexing seems natural. We become aware, in a street
scene (Figure 1C), of the one-way sign, then the pedestrian, then
the tree; subjectively, we experience different objects, features, or
locations competing for awareness. In perceptual processing, the
analogy to multiplexing is far less obvious. A digital commu-
nications engineer, faced with the task of transmitting a street
scene along a limited capacity channel, would be surprised at the
suggestion that one should ﬁrst transmit the one-way sign, then
the pedestrian, then the tree. For one thing, ﬁnding each of the
component objects in order to transmit their information requires
a great deal of complicated processing. In terms of dealing with a
limited capacity channel, there is lower-hanging fruit.
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A more obvious choice to the engineer would be compression,
also known as source coding 1. Compression consists of represent-
ing the input with as few “bits” as possible, while retaining as
much ﬁdelity of the original signal as possible. By compressing the
input, one can push more information through a limited capacity
channel, in less time. Compression can be lossless, i.e., such that
one could perfectly reconstruct the original signal. Simply taking
into account regularities of the world (e.g., in English text, some
letter combinations are more likely than others) and redundancy
in the signal (a patch of bright pixels in an image increases the
chance of more bright pixels nearby) can reduce the number of
bits necessary. Compression can also be lossy, in which one typi-
cally throws away “unimportant” information in order to obtain
greater savings in the number of bits required. For example, JPEG
image compression, in addition to taking into account regularities
and redundancies in the input, typically represents high spatial
frequency information more coarsely than low spatial frequency,
as moderate loss of high spatial frequency information may be
difﬁcult for an observer to detect. Lossy compression “selects”
what information to keep and throw away, but is theoretically
distinct from selection as deﬁned here, i.e., multiplexing. (Loss-
less compression, on the other hand, facilitates communication
through a limited capacity channel, while involving no “selection”
whatsoever.)
The notion of dealing with limited capacity by compressing the
input has not been lost on perception researchers. Even as Broad-
bent (1958) was essentially talking about multiplexing, Attneave
(1954), Miller (1956), and Barlow (1961) were talking about var-
ious forms of compression. However, the association between
consciousness and attention may have biased the way that many
researchers thought about limited capacity. In the attention liter-
ature, it is often stated without proof that limited capacity implies
the need for selection. Certainly limited capacity does not obvi-
ously require selective attention, i.e., multiplexing. Multiplexing
is necessary in digital communications only for certain situations;
should images obviously be thought of as containing multiple
senders competing for limited capacity?On the other hand, redun-
dancies and regularities in the world make compression a clear
choice of strategy for dealing with limited capacity.
If the visual system implements a lossy compression strategy,
this creates problems for reasoning about early vs. late selection.
In behavioral experiments, one can observe only the inputs to
the visual system (images of the world), and the outputs (per-
formance). If information loss due to compression is misattrib-
uted to multiplexing (selective attention), it becomes difﬁcult to
determine the stage at which selective attention operates.
Many of the hypothesized“ﬁxes” to the standard early selection
story amount to lossy compression strategies. Consider, for
example, suggestions that the statistics of a set of items might
be available preattentively (Treisman, 2006; see Alvarez, 2011 for
1A third part of the strategy for dealing with limited capacity is what digital commu-
nications refers to as“channel coding.”This is less relevant for the present discussion,
and involves questions of how the systemconverts the information into a formwhich
can be sent on the physical medium of the channel, be that wires, air, or neurons, in
order to minimize transmission error. In the brain, details of spike rates and spike
timing fall into this category.
a review), and that image statistics might underlie preattentive
recognition of the gist of a scene (Oliva and Torralba, 2006).
Our TTM incorporates both multiplexing and compression.
The multiplexing mechanism consists of shifting one’s eyes in
order to control what information gets through the “channel” at
a given moment. For a given ﬁxation location, the visual system
has devised a general-purpose compression scheme, which repre-
sents the input with a ﬁxed, rich set of local summary statistics,
computed over regions that tile the visual ﬁeld and grow with
eccentricity. We have shown that this model can predict the difﬁ-
culty of visual search tasks; it predicts the binding errors that have
previously led researchers to conclude that attentional selection
occurs early, while also predicting the ease of search for shaded
cubes, which seems antithetical to early selection. Our model also
shows promise in resolving a number of the conundrums sur-
rounding the locus of attentional selection: the fact that observers
can easily judge the gist of a scene or display,while beingmurky on
the details, and the difference between scene search and dual-task
performance. The TTM can more parsimoniously explain these
phenomena than an early selection mechanism.
If selective attention occurs later, then there is no reason to
assume that consciousness would be required for basic percep-
tual processing. This is some relief, and ﬁts well with a number of
functional theories of consciousness. Crick and Koch (1990), for
instance, suggest that consciousness involves an attentional mech-
anism, and that“one of the functions of consciousness is to present
the results of various underlying computations.” If one is present-
ing the results of only a select few computations, presumably one
would want other useful computations to continue unconsciously,
not stop at the stage of feature maps.
As another example, Dennett (1991) has proposed the Multi-
ple Drafts theory of consciousness, in which multiple channels of
“specialist circuits,”processes of interpretation, operate in parallel.
Many of the “drafts” produced by these processes are short-lived,
but some are “promoted to further functional roles.” It is unclear
what role, if any, attention need play, unless perhaps it acts as
a probe which asks questions of the parallel processing streams.
Regardless, surely in this framework one would not want to be
restricted to promoting drafts at such an early stage of interpre-
tation as basic feature maps. Such “specialists” would not be very
specialized, and would leave a great deal of interpretation to some
other processingmodule. Bothpoints seemantithetical toMultiple
Drafts theory.
Finally, in Global Workspace theory, consciousness comes into
play when information needs to be accessed by multiple brain
systems, such asmemory,motor control, verbal systems, and high-
level decision-making systems (Baars, 2005). If we view selective
attention as the mechanism that puts information into the “work-
space,” then we would hardly expect attention to involve early
selection. The visual system should not have to call a conference of
multiple brain systems just to decide whether an image contains a
corner.
Our rethinking of early visual representation seems to have
eliminated a large role for attention in visual search, and per-
haps in other tasks as well. Clearly attention does have measurable
effects in both physiology and behavior (e.g., dual-task experi-
ments). What might attention do? Attention seems to be able to
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modulate neuronal responses to produce increased ﬁring rates,
increase signal-to-noise, and narrow neuronal tuning curves (see
Reynolds and Heeger, 2009, for a review). These effects, by them-
selves, seem unlikely to explain the difference between single- and
dual-task performance. We suggest that different tasks (e.g., per-
forming a covert discrimination of a peripheral stimulus with or
without a simultaneous discrimination task at the fovea) allow
more or less complicated communication within a population of
neurons, enablingmore or less complicated inferences.Withmini-
mal attention, the visual systemmight have access to local statistics
from individual pooling regions across the visual ﬁeld, but not be
able to combine information from overlapping pooling regions
to make more complex inferences. Intersecting constraints from
overlapping pooling regions may not be needed for certain tasks,
such as recognizing the general category of a scene (see Oliva and
Torralba, 2006). However, more complex inference on the out-
puts of multiple pooling regions might make it possible to tell if
an isolated cube were upright or inverted. Comparing the infor-
mation from multiple overlapping pooling regions might explain
the modest decrease in psychophysical pooling region size with
attention (Yeshurun and Rashal, 2010), enable identiﬁcation of an
attended object when two are present within the receptive ﬁeld of
a given neuron (Desimone and Duncan, 1995), or allow an item
to be localized with more precision thanmight be expected from a
single large pooling region (as suggested by Rousselet et al., 2005).
The arguments presented in this paper should have a signiﬁ-
cant impact on discussions of the association between attention
and awareness. If one attributes performance in a number of tasks
to mechanisms of attention, when in fact performance is limited
by lossy representation in early vision, this muddies questions of
whether attention and awareness are the same thing and how they
are linked. Just as one needs to properly understand representation
to understand the impact of attention, one needs to understand
attention to understand its relationship to awareness.
We have contributed to this discussion by presenting a predic-
tive model of peripheral vision. Image synthesis techniques enable
a methodology for making concrete, testable predictions of this
model for a wide range of tasks. In developing such a model, it is
important to understand not only that crowding occurs, perhaps
because of “competition” between stimuli present in a receptive
ﬁeld (Desimone and Duncan, 1995), but also what information is
available to the visual system in a crowded display. This informa-
tion may be the elements from which perception is made, and be
predictive of performance on a wide range of visual tasks.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
VISUAL SEARCH EXPERIMENTS AND CORRESPONDING MONGREL
EXPERIMENTS
Subjects
Ten subjects (six male) participated in feature, conjunction, and
conﬁguration search experiments. The mongrel discrimination
task for ﬁve classic search conditions was carried out by ﬁve
other subjects (four male). A different group of nine subjects
participated in the 3-D cube search experiment. The mongrel dis-
crimination of 3-D cubes was carried out by a different group
of eight subjects. Subjects’ ages ranged from 18 to 45 years. All
reported normal or corrected-to normal vision and were paid for
their participation.
Stimuli and procedure: visual search experiments
Our visual search experiments resemble classic search experiments
in the literature. We tested ﬁve search conditions: conjunction
(targets deﬁned by the conjunction of luminance contrast and
orientation), rotated T among rotated Ls, O among Qs, Q among
Os, and feature search for a tilted line among vertical lines. For 3-D
cube search, we tested search for an inverted cube among upright,
and vice versa.
Stimuli were presented on a 40-cm× 28-cmmonitor,with sub-
jects seated 75 cm away in a dark room.We ran our experiments in
MATLAB, using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). The
search displays consisted of either all distractors (target-absent
trial) or one target and the rest distractors (target-present trial).
Target-present and target-absent displays occurred with equal
probability.
Each search task had four levels of the number of items in
the display (the “set size”): 1, 6, 12, or 18. Stimuli were randomly
placed on four concentric circles, with added positional jitter (up
to one-eighth degree). The radii of the circles were 4˚, 5.5˚, 7˚, and
8.5˚ of visual angle (v.a.).
Each search display remained on screen until subjects
responded. Subjects indicated with a key press whether each stim-
ulus contained or did not contain a target, andwere given auditory
feedback. Each subject ﬁnished 144 trials per search condition (72
target-present and 72 target-absent), evenly distributed across four
set sizes. The order of the search conditions was counterbalanced
across subjects, and blocked by set size.
Stimuli and procedure: mongrel discrimination of target-present vs.
target-absent patches
To measure the informativeness of summary statistics for the
search tasks, we ﬁrst generated 10 target-present and 10 target-
absent patches for each search condition described above. Then,
for each patch, we synthesized 10 new image patches with approx-
imately the same summary statistics as the original patch, using
Portilla and Simoncelli’s (2000) texture synthesis algorithm. This
algorithm ﬁrst measures a set of wavelet-based features at multi-
ple spatial scales, then computes a number of summary statistics,
including joint statistics that describe local relative orientation,
relative phase, and wavelet correlations across position and scale.
To synthesize a new texture, the algorithm then iteratively adjusts
an initial “seed” image (often, as in this experiment, white noise,
but any starting image may be used) until it has approximately the
same statistics as the original image patch. The resulting “mon-
grel” is approximately equivalent to the original input in terms of
the summary statistics measured by the model. Figures 3B, 4, 5,
and 7 all show mongrels generated using this procedure.
During each trial, a mongrel was presented at the center
of the computer screen until subjects made a response. Each
mongrel subtended 3.8˚× 3.8˚ v.a. at a viewing distance of 75 cm.
Subjects were shown examples of original patches, and examples
of mongrels, and asked to categorize each mongrel according to
whether the mongrel was synthesized from a target-present or
target-absent patch. Subjects were instructed that they should
look for any cues to help them perform the task, and that the
target-present mongrels, for instance, might not actually con-
tain a target. Subjects had unlimited time to freely view the
mongrels.
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Each of the conditions (corresponding to a search task, includ-
ing the ﬁve classic search and four cube search-related conditions)
had a total of 100 target+ distractor and 100 distractor-only
patches to be discriminated in this mongrel task, with the ﬁrst
30 trials (15 target+ distractor and 15 distractor-only) serving
as training, to familiarize observers with the nature of the stim-
uli. Observers received auditory feedback about the correctness of
their responses throughout the experiment.
GO/NO-GO RAPID SCENE PERCEPTION TASK AND CORRESPONDING
MONGREL CLASSIFICATION TASK
Subjects
Twenty-four subjects participated in the rapid perception scene
task, all 18–35 years old and reporting normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. All subjects were paid for their participation.
A second group of 24 subjects participated in an online mon-
grel classiﬁcation task on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. All
subjects gave written informed consent and were paid for their
participation.
Stimuli and procedure: go/no-go task scene discrimination
Subjects were randomly assigned to either the animal-detection
or vehicle-detection task (12 subjects completed each task). The
stimuli were a randomly selected subset of the images used by Li
et al. (2002). The target images for the animal-detection task were
240 scenes containing animals (including mammals, birds, rep-
tiles, ﬁsh, and insects). The target images for the vehicle-detection
task were 240 scenes containing vehicles (including cars, trains,
boats, planes, and hot-air balloons). The distractor set for each
task included 120 images from the other target category, plus
120 scenes which contained neither vehicles nor animals (which
included images of plants, food, landscapes, and buildings). Stim-
uli were presented in grayscale at 384 by 256 pixels (8.9˚× 6.0˚)
on a 34-cm× 60-cm monitor, with subjects seated 75 cm away in
a dark room.
We ran our experiments in MATLAB, using the Psychophysics
Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). Subjects were instructed to hold down
the left mouse button throughout the experiment. At the start of
a trial, a central ﬁxation cross appeared for 300± 100ms, and was
followed by an image presented for 20ms. The image appeared
either at the center of the screen or left or right of the ﬁxation
(center of the image at 11˚ eccentricity). If the image contained a
target (animal or vehicle), subjects were to respond by releasing
the left mouse button as quickly as possible (subjects made no
response to non-target images). Subjects were given 1000ms to
make their response.
Subjects completed 10 blocks of 48 trials, with a break after
each block. Each block contained an equal number of target and
non-target images, and an equal number of images in each of the
three presentation locations (left, center, and right).
Stimuli and procedure: mongrel scene classiﬁcation
For the scene stimuli, we synthesized full-ﬁeld mongrels based
on the TTM. Given a ﬁxation point, the full-ﬁeld synthesis algo-
rithm tiles the image with overlapping pooling regions. The
size of the pooling regions increases with distance from ﬁxa-
tion according to Bouma’s Law. Within each pooling region, the
model computes summary statistics using procedures similar to
those described above for single pooling region mongrels, and
as described in Portilla and Simoncelli (2000). Synthesis is initi-
ated by assuming the foveal region (a small circle about ﬁxation)
is reconstructed perfectly. Then, moving outward, each subse-
quent pooling region is synthesized using the previous partial
synthesis result as the seed for the texture synthesis process. The
process iterates a number of times over the entire image. We use
a coarse-to-ﬁne strategy to speed convergence. Figures 3D, 9B,C,
and 11B,C show example mongrels generated using this full-ﬁeld
procedure.
We generatedmongrels for each image used in the rapid percep-
tion experiment. Pooling regions were placed to simulate ﬁxation
in either the center of the image or 11˚ left or right of center, to
match the rapid perception task.
Subjects completed the task on their own computer, using
a web interface on the Amazon Mechanical Turk website
(www.mturk.com). The experiment consisted of 480 trials which
exactly matched one the 24 sessions of the rapid perception exper-
iment. On each trial, subjects were shown a mongrel version of
an image from the rapid perception task. Mongrel images were
always presented in the center of the screen, but had been synthe-
sized to simulate the image’s position in the rapid perception task
(left of, right of, or at ﬁxation). Subjects respondedwith a key press
to indicate whether or not the mongrel corresponded to the tar-
get category for the experimental session (“animal” or “vehicle”).
Instruction was otherwise similar to that in the above mongrel
experiments. Subjects received feedback after each response. Sub-
jects could study the mongrels for as long as they wished before
making a response.
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